#Coldcard助記詞缺陷致BTC被盜

Coldcard issues Mk3 seed warning after 594 BTC theft raises security concerns Coinkite warned that wallets created on Coldcard Mk3 devices running firmware versions 4.0.1 through 5.0.3 may be at risk due to a seed generation flaw. Users are advised to migrate funds immediately. The warning comes as investigators continue probing the recent theft of 594 BTC from hundreds of single-signature wallets, though no evidence has confirmed a link between the two incidents.

TL;DR on the Coldcard vulnerability: If you didn't provide the entropy for your seed (didn't roll a dice 100+ times and/or add a solid '25th-word' passphrase) you need to be moving your funds ASAP. The MK3 is most vulnerable, but the MK4, MK5, and Q are also affected.

Coldcard Mk3 users: if your seed was generated on-device (firmware 4.0.1+, ~2021 onward) without dice rolls or a passphrase, your funds may be at risk. Migrate ASAP. Multisig users are protected by design: even a fully compromised key can’t move funds on its own. This is exactly the failure mode multisig exists for. No emergency migration needed, just rotate the affected Mk3 key at your convenience.

Coldcard has disclosed a vulnerability in how their devices generate random numbers for seeds, and outside researchers have corroborated the issue. While the issue originated in Coldcard’s firmware and not Unchained tech stack, at this time, and out of an abundance of caution, our recommendation is to rotate any Coldcard-generated key to a key generated on a different device. This issue is most severe if you use two Coldcard-generated keys for your Unchained 2-of-3 multisig vault. Within any standard 2-of-3 configuration, if only one key is compromised, funds are generally considered safe. However, clients should still replace their key as soon as practicable. Moving too quickly or panicking can lead to mistakes. Scammers target people who are fearful. When communicating with our team, always verify your Unchained representative using Support PINs: https://t.co/stNEGfqfWA

Today it appears that the entropy (or lack thereof) behind Cold Card seed generation was exploited. The tl;dr is that bad randomness in Mk3 seed generation for Cold Card hardware wallets led cluster of roughly 594 BTC being swept from about 500 addresses in a short window. Coinkite warns that seeds generated on Mk3 firmware 4.0.1 through 5.0.3 may be at risk. However there's evidence that Mk4, Q, and Mk5 could also be affected, though would require much more compute. The proposed mechanism is: 1. The Mk3’s seed-generation path produced insufficiently unpredictable entropy for some setups. 2. Instead of a truly 128/256-bit secret, the output may have been drawn from a much smaller or structured state space. 3. An attacker can reproduce the candidate seeds offline, derive standard BIP-32/BIP-44 address paths, and scan the blockchain for funded matches. 4. Once a candidate matches a known address, the attacker has the corresponding private key and can sweep it. The device PIN, air gap, and secure element do not help at that point. no reason to believe that Ledger, GridPlus, or Trezor devices share similar shortcomings, but this DOES highlight something: trust is everywhere in crypto. We want things to be trustless, but you have to trust that: - your exchange won't ban you - your wallet software won't act maliciously - your hardware wallet firmware won't export your private keys to the feds - your seed is generated with sufficient entropy It seems like nothing is safe. At this point I have to recommend multi-device multisigs for anything of significant value to you. Generate at least two seeds using at least two different vendors (say GridPlus and Ledger) and then configure a multisig using wallets from each seed. Write the seeds only on paper, split them via shamir secret sharing and distribute them geographically, among family etc. Or just give up the dream and buy crypto ETFs.

🚨 ALERT: Coinkite warns that funds on Coldcard Mk3 devices running firmware from 4.0.1 through 5.0.3 may be at risk. Users are urged to migrate to an unaffected model or set a BIP-39 passphrase immediately. https://t.co/1Qd1dhYctf