Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/08/26政策影响Founder = prophet
Angels = apostles
VC = priesthood
Pitch deck = scripture
Term sheet = covenant
Demo day = conversion ritual
Early employees = disciples
Early users = converts
PMF = revelation
Pivot = reincarnation
Failure = trial
Exit = judgment day
Next startup = second coming
AI：偏政策推进，强调合规落地与规则明晰，对监管主线更敏感。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/08/25赛道影响Been on the slopes for the past two weeks with our capital markets team. Main offsite question: where can we still hide from the AI grey rhino? 🦏
Uncomfortable conclusion: EVERYTHING is one AI trade now - technology, utilities, industrials, real estate, banks, pe/pc/vc. everyone is underwriting assumption: downstream RoI will eventually justify the upstream capex and credit
It’s trickle-down economics with GPUs and one dream of AGI, except nothing is trickling down
AI：偏主题投资表达，释放对基础设施与新叙事的偏多信号。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/08/24赛道影响Crypto and AI are the same eschatological trade with opposite ownership regimes: Crypto said money would collapse, but anyone could buy BTC. AI says labor will collapse, but the upside is gated behind large VCs, frontier lab equity, private rounds
AI：偏主题投资表达，释放对基础设施与新叙事的偏多信号。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/08/11观点输出The Great Firewall controlled what people could see. The Great Liquidity Firewall controls where their capital is allowed to invest. https://t.co/WA9BQKdPN2
AI：延续个人公开立场，强调长期主义、执行效率与行业方向判断。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/08/03赛道影响First the innovators, then the imitators, last come the idiots
where we are at the ai super-cycle?
AI：偏主题投资表达，释放对基础设施与新叙事的偏多信号。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/07/30赛道影响TSMC might hold off a worst ai bubble until 2028, at least we wont have chips flood the market till then
Beijing demands using Huawei's over Nvidia (4 Huawei 950 ≈ 1 GB300), but still its capacity is far from enough to feed local Chinese model cos and hyperscalers https://t.co/ZYcjU3iilL
AI：偏主题投资表达，释放对基础设施与新叙事的偏多信号。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/07/28观点输出"New Paradigm" !!! https://t.co/oX45cOShpG
AI：延续个人公开立场，强调长期主义、执行效率与行业方向判断。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/07/22观点输出need to decouple domestic vs offshore re the Japanification parallel. net overseas assets is ~80% of Japan's GDP now a structural shift compared to the 90s. most of japs' internationals co's overseas subsidiaries flip their parent revenues (over 70% rev share) GDP is itself is a bad metric imo.
AI：偏平台经营与生态扩张，强调交易平台和应用入口的长期位置。
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/07/21赛道影响China macro is turning into an extreme dispersion trade. Headline GDP is becoming almost useless.. Japanification, but with geographic arbitrage both domestically and internationally is my closest mental model for what comes next
Maybe this is what the last inning of industrial and geopolitical catch-up looks like: hyper-competitiveness abroad, household retrenchment at home. Export strength no longer translates cleanly into household income or confidence; youth unemployment remains elevated at ~16%, even after excluding students. China may be entering a long cycle of Japanification, but with much more room for geographic arbitrage, both within China and across its supply chains.
Externally, China looks almost unstoppable: June exports +27% YoY, H1 high-tech manufacturing +13.3%, IC manufacturing +67.3%. Manufacturing PMI crawled back above 50. AI-linked demand and high-end exports are doing the heavy lifting.
But some of this demand is borrowed from the future. AI capex is partly a game of musical chairs and future capacity lock-in, while the export surge contains tariff front-loading. Neither is a durable substitute for domestic consumption.
Inside China, the picture is almost inverted. Retail sales fell 0.6% YoY in May and grew only 1.0% in June. H1 fixed-asset investment fell 5.7%, property investment fell 18%, and new-home sales value fell 13.6%.
The price chain does not look good either: producer input prices +6.4%, factory-gate prices +4.1%, CPI only +1.0%. Costs are moving downstream much faster than consumer pricing power. Many downstream firms have to absorb the gap through thinner margins, intensifying the rat race.
Even consumption itself is dispersing. Urban retail was -0.9% in May vs rural +1.5%; in June, +0.8% vs +2.1%. But rural outlets are only ~14% of total retail, and the rural print is policy-sensitive, wont be able to carry the entire economy
Japan after the 1980s bubble offers a strong parallel: stagnation from the early 1990s, then persistent deflation from the late 1990s into the early 2010s. But China has a continental shock absorber Japan never had at this scale: a vast interior homeland where housing and daily life are far cheaper, while infra and digital services have narrowed the quality of life gap with tier 1 cities. The option to leave tier 1 cities and return home has become a popular choices for many, this can lower household burn rates and may soften the social transmission of stagnation
Writing this, NF’s Hope started playing in my head:
Thirty years of running, thirty years of searching
Thirty years of hurting, thirty years of pain
For China, make it almost fifty.
Almost fifty years of running from scarcity since Reform and Opening, searching for modernity, and avg citizens absorbing the pain of remaking an entire society at impossible speed
Maybe that is the eternal paradox of industrial catch-up: a country can arrive frontier before its people feel they have.
Dovey Wan@DoveyWan · 2026/07/20赛道影响Open weights don’t need full parity with frontier labs. They only need what I call “pleb parity”: get close enough on high-value, high-volume task at a time, so 20 specialized plebs can divide the work and level the game against one elite.
When you have a gang of equally talented, frugal and relentless Chinese AI founders, who stays #1 on the leaderboard matters less. What matters is that whenever one falls behind, another open-weight peer fills the gap very soon
My simple mental model for Anthropic/OpenAI’s future ARR is the frontier-call ratio: Across an end-to-end business outcome, what % of steps still MUST call the most expensive frontier model?
As plebs pushes that ratio down, pricing power and future ARR growth expectations get eroded. Think of the most elite revenue-generating team inside a company. How many seats truly need to be filled by Ivy/Stanford grads?
AI stacks will look the same: frontier intelligence for the key steps where it materially changes the outcome; open weights everywhere else.
The only domains I can think of with a real case for unlimited frontier-token budgets
1) Quant trading, mm and pod shops: RenTech, Jane Street, Point72 etc where raw intellectual horsepower can be translated directly into P&L
2) Ultra-high-stakes discovery: next-gen chips and materials, cancer drugs, etc. But even there, the upside/scale is limited by the even more scarce giga brain human minds to define the right problem and know where to tinker, not by token or compute
For the rest of the world, and most knowledge-work domains, pleb parity is probably the long-term equilibrium.
Long live the plebs. Kudos to every Chinese AI founder and engineer working against the odds to make it happen
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